
















In the early 1960's, labor-market economists
began to focus our attention on the historical
correlation between movements in economic
activity and the size of the labor force. They
found that during economic downturns, sizable
numbers of individuals either left the labor
force or postponed entering the market, while
during the initial phases of business recovery,
unusual amounts of workers joined the labor
force. These cyclical movements showed the
existence of a sizable labor-force reserve, a
group of workers willing and available for
work according to the state of the economy.
This labor-force reserve posed a special
problem for policymakers. During recession-
ary periods, with some individuals leaving the
labor force, the official unemployment rate
would not reflect the "true" cyclical amount of
unemployment. During the recovery period,
in contrast, greater than average increases in
the labor force would produce a stickiness in
the unemployment rate, preventing it from sig-
naling an improvement in employment and
business activity. Consequently, policymakers
eventually tried to get better estimates of the
size of this labor-force reserve, to determine
whether the reserve should be included as part
of the official labor force. In 1967, the Census
Bureauadded a list ofquestions to the monthly
Current Population Survey, to estimate the
size of this reserve of "discouraged workers."
The survey counts as discouraged those who
say they want a job but haven't looked recently
because they believe they could not find work
even after a job search. On this basis, the
availability of a person for work distinguishes
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those in the labor-force reserve from other
labor market non-participants.
Published analyses of discouraged worker
survey data, however, do not provide an une-
quivocal answer to the question of including
such workers in the official labor-force count.
For instance, many workers who give personal
reasons for their discouragement with job-
market prospects appear insensitive to changes
in the availability of jobs, and thus do not
appear to represent a ready labor-force re-
serve. A recent study by the National Com-
mission for Employment and Unemployment
Statistics recommended that discouraged
workers be counted outside the labor force
until more could be learned about their avail-
ability and commitment to the job market.
The resolution ofthis issue has major public-
policy implications. If discouraged workers
were added to the labor force, they would sig-
nificantly increase the official unemployment
rate-from 6.0 percent to 6.8 percent in 1978,
for example. Under existing laws, such as the
Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act (CETA), more Federal funds hence would
be allocated to states and localities, as a means
of meeting the government's full-employment
objectives.
The purpose of this paper is to study dis-
couraged-worker behavior within the frame-
work provided by job-search theory, to shed
some light on the job-market availability and
commitment of discouraged workers. In its
study, the National Commission applied a con-
ventional unemployment model, relating dis-
couragement to changes in the unemployment
rate-a proxy for overall labor-market condi-
tions-and a time trend, which proxies for themany other economic and social factors that
affect workers' decisions. A job-search model
also focuses upon general labor-market con-
ditions (because they are associated with the
cost offinding work), but in addition, it focuses
on unemployment-insurance benefit payments
and on the real wages the individual expects
to receive in the market.
Section I provides a brief discussion of the
survey data and characteristics of discouraged
workers. This is followed in Section II by a
discussion of the conventional unemployment
and job-search models. Section III presents
empirical results, and the final section dis-
cusses the conclusions of the study.
I. Characteristics of Discouraged Workers
Discouraged workers are persons who want 1. Believes no work available III line of
jobs, but who have not looked for work re- work or area;
cently because they believe they would be un- 2. Could not find any work;
successful even if they looked for jobs. These 3. Lacks necessary schooling, training,
people are not counted as part of the labor skills, or experience;
force nor ofthe officially unemployed, because 4. Employers think too young or too old; or
they do not meet the necessary criterion of 5. Other personal handicaps (such as dis-
having actively searched for work in the last crimination by employers) in finding a
four weeks. The U.S. Department of Labor job.
defines "actively searching" rather liberally; it No questions are asked regarding the type
includes registering for work when one collects of work or the pay the individual has in mind.
unemployment-insurance benefits, talking to Since these issues are important to a job
neighbors about job opportunities, and ac- seeker, analysts generally interpret an individ-
tually being interviewed. ual's belief that no work is available as mean-
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has been col- ing a belief that no "suitable" work is avail-
lecting data on discouraged workers since able.
1967, through a set ofsupplementary questions Other reasons non-participants give for not
on the monthly Current Population Survey- looking for work-although wantingwork-in-
the source of the basic employment and un- clude school attendance, ill health and home
employment data. Questions regarding labor- responsibilities. A person will be classified as
force non-participation, however, are asked not discouraged, even if giving reasons for dis-
each month of only one-fourth of the sample, couragement, when other explanations such as
and the data are published only as quarterly home responsibilities or ill health are also
averages. given. The object of the classification scheme
For each individual who is not in the labor is to separate those workers who are available
force during the week the Current Population for work from those who supposedly are not,
Survey is taken, two key questions differen- since these others have responsibilities or
tiate discouraged workers from others: physical handicaps that would keep them from
1. Does...want a regular job now, either accepting work even if it were available. This
full or part-time? availability is at the heart of the contention
2. What are the reasons.. .is not looking that discouraged workers should be included
for work? in the official labor force.
A person is classified as a discouraged Most people not in the labor force during
worker if he/she answers yes or maybe to the the typical survey week in 1978 did not want
first question, if his/her major activity during a job at that time (Table 1). About 5.3 million
the survey week was not attending school, and people reported wanting a job-butonly a por-
if he/she did not seek work because of one of tion ofthese, 845,000 persons, offered reasons
the following reasons: related to discouragement over job prospects
8Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earnings, January 1979, Tables 1 and 39, annual averages.
Table 1
Civilian Employment, Unemployment and
Persons Not in the Labor Force, 1978
(thousands of persons)
all market conditions (Table 2). Between 35
and 40 percent of all discouraged workers are
females between the ages of 25 and 59 years.
The relative number of older discouraged
workers, aged 60 and over, has fallen for both
sexes since 1968, while the proportion of
younger workers (16 to 24) has increased.
for not seeking work. Discouraged workers
represented 0.5 percent of the population in
1978, and if included in the labor force would
have increased the official unemployment rate
from 6.0 percent to 6.8 percent.
Discouraged workers who believed that no
work was available, or who could not find any
work, were classified as discouraged for job-
market reasons. The others were classified as
discouraged for personal reasons. The number
of people giving job-market reasons for dis-
couragement has exceeded those citing per-
sonal factors ever since the survey began, ex-
cept in the very first quarter of 1967 (Chart 1).
The number of discouraged for job-market
reasons (but not for personal reasons) has gen-
erally reflected cyclical movements in labor-
market conditions. Since the early 1970's, dis-
couragement for job-market reasons has ac-
counted for between 70 and 80 percent of the
total.
Most discouraged workers are female; their
share of that total has remained close to two-
thirds over the past decade regardless ofover-
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9How serious are these workers about want-
ing a job? If, for instance, an individual has
not searched for work in over a year, we could
ask whether he/she actually wanted or was
available for employment. The Current Pop-
ulation Survey does not regularly collect data
which could help answer that question, except
for a special list of questions added to the
survey in September and October 1978.
4 This
inquiry found that 44 percent of discouraged
workers (and 50 percent of those discouraged
for job-market reasons) had looked for work
during the previous twelve months. For some
people, however, the absence of recent search
did not mean lack of labor-market commit-
ment. (Some individuals go directly from em-
ployment to discouragement, as in the case of
a plant shutdown which provides the major
source of employment in a small community.)
Adding together those reporting either recent
work or search experience in the 1978 survey,
62 percent of the discouraged workers (and 70
percent of those discouraged for job-market
reasons) had some form of labor-market com-
mitment-were either employed or officially
unemployed-during the prior twelve months.
The evidence of labor-market attachment,
coupled with the National Commission's evi-
dence that nearly 80 percent of the discour-
aged contemplate searching for work in the
next twelve months,l suggests that the duration
of discouragement for many of these workers
may be relatively short-lived.
Table 2
Discouraged Workers, by Age and Sex
Thousands of Persons Percent Distribution
1968 1973 1975 1978 1968 1973 1975 1978
All Discouraged
Workers 667 679 1,082 845 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Males, 16 and over 213 225 359 305 31.9 33.1 33.2 36.1
16-19 42 58 72 6.3 8.5 8.1 8.5
20-24 10 23 57 43 1.5 3.4 5.3 5.1
25-59 53 67 lO6 110 7.9 9.9 9.8 13.0
60 and over 107 77 lO9 79 16.0 11.3 10.1 9.3
Females, 16 and over 455 454 722 540 68.2 66.9 66.7 64.0
16-19 67 75 90 60 10.0 11.0 8.3 7.1
20-24 47 75 110 75 7.0 11.0 10.2 8.9
25-59 240 251 433 305 36.0 37.0 40.0 36.1
60 and over lOI 54 88 lOl 15.1 7.9 8.1 11.9
Souree: Employment & Earnings, seleeted issues.
10II. Unemployment and Job-Search Models
The conventional framework for analyzing
discouraged-worker behavior is an unemploy-
ment model, l.2 which relates discouragement
to the unemployment rate and time-trend var-
iables. The unemployment rate reflects the rel-
ative availability of jobs, so that an increase
(decrease) in joblessness is expected to in-
crease (decrease) the number of discouraged
workers in the population. The time-trend var-
iable represents other economic and social de-
terminants of discouragement about which not
enough is known to explain the trends. The
unemployment model has been criticized for
assuming that labor-supply behavior is unre-
sponsive to wages, and in general for not being
based on principles of rational economic be-
havior.
9 As an alternative, we turn to a model
based upon microeconomic theory, in which
expected real wages and job-search costs influ-
ence job-market participation decisions.
Job-search models are simplified descrip-
tions ofhow rational individuals who are seek-
ing to maximize utility go about looking for
work and accepting job offers.
5
,6,8The general
framework is applicable to the issue ofwhether
to participate in the labor market, and may be
employed to study discouraged-worker ornon-




heart of the search model is the notion that
job-market decisions must be made in the face
ofuncertainty, especially uncertainty about the
wage that will be offered when a particular
employer is contacted. This uncertainty leads
the job seeker to devise an "optimal search
strategy"-a search procedure designed to en-
sure that the individual accepts only the job
offer which provides the maximum expected
return (see Appendix 2 for a presentation of
the model).
In constructing our job-search model, we
begin with an individual who has entered the
labor force, knowing that a search for work
must be conducted before any offer can be
expected. The job seeker presumably has ac-
curate information about the average wage
and dispersion of wages in the market for a
person with similar qualifications, but is un-
certain about the wage that may be offered by
any individual employer. Searching for work
is costly. We assume that search costs include
such direct expenses as transportation and the
mailing of resumes, and that those costs are
duplicated for each additional job contact. In
this simplified model, wages and costs incurred
should be interpreted as discounted present
values, and the individual is assumed to be risk
neutral.
Since the job seeker has knowledge of the
market distribution ofwage offers and the cor-
responding costs ofgenerating those offers, an
estimate can be made of the maximum ex-
pected return from search-the "reservation
wage." The individual's optimal search strat-
egy, then, simply is to accept any wage offer
which is equal to or greater than the reserva-
tion wage, and to reject all other offers (i.e.,
continue to search).
The job-search procedure alternatively can
be described in terms of an optimal stopping
rule. If the job seeker refuses a job offer,
he/she will incur additional search costs. At the
same time, the individual has an expectation
of additional gains from further search; that is,
an expectation ofbeing offered a wage greater
than the current offer. If the expected wage
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costs, depicted as the difference (cj - UIE). At
such a level, an individual will search for em-
ployment and accept a job offer equal to or
greater than W*.
Finally, an increase in the mean expected
real wage (current wages adjusted for expected
inflation) would tend to decrease non-partici-
pation and vice versa. An increase in the av-
erage market wage, with costs constant, shifts
the H(w) line upward and to the right as in
Figure 3. This shift leads to decreased dis-
couragement, since the wage of W* now rep-
resents a net gain from additional job search.
Several qualifications should be noted, how-
ever. First, we have assumed that the individ-
ual places no value on his/her non-market
time; that is, time spent in leisure, child care,
home maintenance, and any other activity out-
side the labor force. For some individuals, non-
market time carries a relatively high value,
while for others the reverse is true. A mean-
ingful solution to the labor-market participa-
tion decision exists if, and only if, the reser-
vation wage (the maximum expected return
from market work) exceeds the value the in-
dividual places on his/her non-market time.
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According to our search model, labor-force
participation is influenced by real wages. How-
ever, the model makes no distinction between
Figure 2
seeker will refuse the current job offer and
continue to search. Similarly, if the expected
wage gain is just equal to, or less than, the
marginal cost, the current wage offer will be
accepted and search terminated. In this man-
ner, the optimal time to stop search and accept
employment occurs when the expected wage
gain is just equal to the marginal cost of con-
tinuing to search. At that point, the individual
has been offered the maximum expected re-
turn-the reservation wage-from the job
market (Figure 1).
Each point on the locus, H(w), in Figure 1
gives the expected return an individual can
anticipate from further search if the reserva-
tion wage corresponding to that point is
adopted. At the reservation wage, W*, the
expected marginal return from search is just
matched by the marginal search costs. Conse-
quently, no further gains from search are ex-
pected, and the wage, W*, represents the re-
servation wage the individual adopts in his/her
job search.
H(w) slopes downward because the proba-
bility of being offered a wage equal to or
greater than w declines the higher the current
wage offer.
5 Thus these jobs will be pursued
only if the marginal search cost is low.
Ifsearch costs are increased sufficiently, the
individual would drop out ofthe labor market,
because the marginal costs offinding a job are
greater than the expected gains offered in the
market. This occurs at a cost equal to or
greater than Co in Figure 1. Therefore, when
relatively high search costs exist, or when they
increase, some individuals can be expected to
leave the market before finding suitable em-
ployment.
Unemployment insurance benefits (UIE)
will help to cover the direct costs of search for
those individuals eligible to collect such ben-
efits. By lowering the net costs of search, UIE
can be expected to keep people in the labor
force who might otherwise have dropped out
because of high search costs (Figure 2). With
search costs relatively high at cp for instance,
the individual will find searching for work un-
profitable. The payment of unemployment-in-







permanent and temporary (or transitory) real
wages, although recent theory and empirical
results suggest that that distinction is impor-
tant in labor-supply behavior. Milton Fried-
man has suggested that the supply of labor
may respond differently to a wage change ex-
pected to be temporary than to one expected
to be permanent, i.e., expected to continue.3
According to this view, workers plan their time
to take advantage of a temporary opportunity
to earn higher-than-normal wages, and take
more leisure or non-market time later. There-
fore, an expected temporary change in wages
is likely to have a greater absolute impact upon
labor supply than a wage change regarded as
permanent. Empirical results have found the
distinction between temporary and permanent
wages relevant in the labor-supply behavior of
married women.
l1 Other studies have found
temporary wages to be statistically significant
in explaining aggregate labor-supply partici-
pation and the labor-market decisions ofmajor
age-sex groupS.7,17 Our job-search model may
be amended, then, to consider the reactions of
individuals to both transitory and permanent
components of real market wages.
Another question is whether a job seeker
will later drop out and become discouraged if
there are no changes in search costs or ex-
pected market wages. Previously we assumed
that an individual would have no motivation
to drop out ofthe laborforce once he/she made
the initial decision to look for work. This was
because we placed no limit on the amount of
time the individual would search for employ-
ment, and assumed that the individual had no
prior information to differentiate among pro-
spective employers. If either of these assump-
tions is relaxed, we find that the individual
may indeed drop out, even in the absence of
any changes in search costs or expected real
wages.
If a person sets a limit on the amount of
time to search for a job, then as time goes on,
the chances of finding suitable employment
decline. As a result, the individual will tend to
lower his/her reservation wage. Since search
costs are positive, and the reservation wage
falls over time, a point can be reached when
continued search becomes unprofitable and the
person drops out fo the market. It may be
argued that a person's retirement age sets an
effective upper limit on the search horizon, so
that senior workers are more likely to drop
out ofthe labor market than younger people.!3
In addition, an individual may have some
information about wages that are likely to be
offered by particular employers. For instance,
help-wanted ads regularly indicate which firms
are most likely to have vacancies. Conse-
quently, even before contacting an employer,
a job searcher may possess information which
permits him/her to distinguish among firms.
Under these circumstances, an optimal search
strategy involves sampling specific firms in a
systematic fashion, rather than randomly, as
assumed above. IS The individual first searches
the firm with the highest expected return, and
so on down the list, sampling his/her best op-
portunities first and poorer ones later. In the
search process, the reservation wage declines
over time, and with positive search costs, the
individual may thus find at some point that
additional search is no longer profitable. The
person drops out of the market, discouraged
with having received no suitable job offer.
Finally, income from other sources-such as
the wage income of other family members-is








13ticipation decision. All other things being
equal, an increase in real wage income of other
family members allows that family to have
more leisure (non-market time) and more
goods. In fact, a change in the average wage
paid in the market reflects changes in both the
individual's expected wage and the wage of
other family members. In the market, then,
we might observe two opposing labor flows in
response to a change in average real wages.
As wages increase, some individuals may leave
the labor market due to the higher family in-
come (income effect), and others will enterthe
market enticed by the higher salaries they can
command (substitution effect). Which effect
predominates will have to be answered empir-
ically, since economic theory provides no an-
swer to this issue. Also, in light ofour previous
discussion, these income and substitution ef-
fects may differ in magnitude, according to
whether the individual regards the change in
real wages as transitory or permanent.
The job-search model may be summarized
as follows:
+
DW f(c, uib, wP, w
t
)
where DW = proportion of discouraged
workers in the population
c = direct costs of search
uib = unemployment-insurance
benefit payments
wP = permanent wages
w
t = transitory wages
and the signs over the variables indicate the
direction of expected impact upon the propor-
tion of discouraged workers in the population.
The higher costs of search will lead to higher
rates of discouragement, while unemployment
benefits act to decrease the net costs of search
and the amount of discouragement. Wages,
whether permanent or temporary, should work
in the same direction although with different
strengths. An increase in wage levels should
lead to a decline in the discouragement rate as
individuals 1) enter the labor market in expec-
tation of higher wages, or 2) decide that they
do not want a job because the consequent in-
crease in family income enables them to en-
gage in more non-market activities. In this lat-
ter case, a person remains a non-participant,
but leaves the ranks of the discouraged for
another non-participant group.
III. Empirical Results
We are now ready to apply statistical tests to
estimatetheinfluence ofthevariablessuggested
by search theory on the number of discouraged
workers in the population. Previous studies, as
well as our initial work, suggested little con-
nection between changes in economic condi-
tions and the number of workers discouraged
for personal reasons.
1
,2 Therefore, we have
concentrated on those discouraged for job-
market reasons, who have accounted for 70 to
80 percent of the total number of discouraged
workers over the past decade.
According to search theory, discouragement
is likely to be related to a measure ofthedirect
costs of search, to unemployment-insurance
benefit payments, and to real wages. After
some experimenting, equation (1) was chosen
on the basis of best fit, as measured by the
higest correlation among variables. The equa-
14
tion was estimated not only for the total num-
ber discouraged for job-market reasons, but
also for age and sex groups within that total.
Finally, the equation was estimated for "other
non-participants"-the total number of non-
participants in the population less all discour-
aged workers-as a means of comparing the
behavior ofvarious classes ofnon-participants.
The "a's" are constants estimated by ordi-
nary least-square regression techniques. The
subscripts refer to the current quarter "t" and
the previous quarter "t-1." The data sources
are detailed in Appendix 1, and the variables
are defined as follows:OW/Pop = proportionofdiscouraged work-
ers for job-market reasons in the civilian pop-
ulation, sixteen years and over. Separate
regressions were estimated for the total, and
for major age and sex classifications, divided
by their respective populations.
V = unemployment rate. The unemploy-
ment rate of each age-sex category was used
in the equation for the corresponding cohort
of discouraged worker. In the aggregate equa-
tion, for both discouraged workers and other
non-partcipants, the unemployment rate of
males aged 25 to 54 was used as an indicator
of overall labor-market tightness.
VIE = the ratio of maximum weekly un-
employment-insurance benefits to spendable
average weekly earnings of a production
worker with three dependents. In estimating
the net cost of job search, we assume that an
individual compares unemployment-insurance
benefit payments to net after-tax potential
earnings, as measured by VIB.
W = measure of temporary real wages,
equal to the difference between current real
wages and permanent real wages (see Appen-
dix 1). In line with previous time-series stud-
ies, we uncovered no statistically significant





we dropped the permanent wage measure and
included only the transitory component ofreal
wages as a determinant of labor supply.
The two equations in Table 3 show the re-
sults of estimating equation (1) separately for
the percentage of females in the working-age
population who are discouraged for job-mar-
ket reasons (OJOBF), and similarly for males
(OJOBM). In neither case is the search frame-
work entirely successful in explaining the dis-
couragement rate over the past decade. For
males, the unemployment rate-the proxy for
overall job availability and direct costs of
search-is the only statistically significant de-
terminant of their discouragement rate. (The
statistical F test also indicated that as a group
the other variables did not add significantly to
the determination of the male discouragement
rate.) In contrast, the net cost of search-as
captured by both the unemployment rate and
relative unemployment-insurance benefits-is
a statistically significant determinant offemale
discouragement. Real transitory wages, both
current and lagged one quarter, are also statis-
tically significant factors determining female
discouragement. According to search theory,
the level of real wages should affect the dis-
couragement rate over time, but our estimates
instead find that the change in transitory real
Table 3
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number of female discouraged workers as a percentage of total female population, 16 years and over.
number of male discouraged workers as a percentage of total male population, 16 and over.
unemployment rate of the respective cohort
maximum unemployment-insurance benefit payments as a percentage of spendable average-weekly earnings
of a production worker with three dependents.
Current real hourly compensation less permanent real hourly wages.
statistics in parentheses.
15wages over a six-month period-rather than
the level-is the significant determinant among
females. The estimated coefficients associated
with the real wage terms are of opposite signs
and are not much different from each other,
and their sum is not different from zero. This
means that any given level of real.transitory
wages that has persisted for atleast two quar-
ters will have no net impact, and only a change
in real transitory wages remains as a determi-
nant of the female discouragement rate.
The results suggest that the availability of
work may be the sole factor influencing male
discouragement with job-market conditions.
Additional factors, however, are important in
the participation decision of the much larger
group of females, who comprise two-thirds of
discouraged workers. In particular, both the
liberality of unemployment-insurance benefits
and the change in real transitory wages have
been found to have significant effects on fe-
male discouragement decisions.
As the earlier discussion suggests, discour-
aged males have not been as responsive as
females Over the past decade to changes in
labor-market conditions. Males, on average,
place a relatively low value ontheirnon-mar-
ket time since, as a group, they constitute the
primary source of family income. Conse-
quently, they are more likely than females to
be labor-market participants, and are less
likely to leave the job market after encounter-
ingchanges in real wages Or net search costs.
For instance, a one-percentage-point change in
their own unemployment rate led to an aver-
age change of only .032 percentage points in
the male discouragement rate, and to more
than three times that amount (.102) in the
female discouragement rate (Table 3). Other
factors than relatively high non-market value
Table 4
Discouragement Rates
1 of Female and Male Discouraged Workers
for Job Market Reasons, by Age;
(Sample Period 1969.1-1978.2)
Mean
Females Constant U(t-1) UIB(t-1) W(t) W(t-1) T TSQ
Discouragement . 2
DW Rate R --
16-19 .532 .080 .018 .64 .21 1.89
(.614) (2.87) ( - 1.65)
20-24 .938 .090 - .017 -3.16 2.95 .68 .23 2.50
(1.11) (2.58) ( - 1.49) ( 2.27) (1.89)
25-59 .400 .134 -.009 .997 1.03 .55 .69 1.99
(1.21) (6.80) (2.06) (-1.78) (1.65)
60 and .53 .035 .025 .0003 .21 29 1.09
over (4.13) (2.37) (-3.3) (3.27)
Males --
16-19 .586 .029 .56 .27 2.06
(1.04) (2.14)
20-24 .428 .037 .36 .52 1.88
(1.10) (4.05)
25-29 .058 .022 .15 .52 2.10
(.540) (3.54)
60 and .41 .049 .29 .29 2.34
over (1.12) (1.78)
1 Discouragement rate is the number of discouraged workers in a cohort as a percentage of their respective population.
* Not significant at 10-percent level of significance. See Table 3 for explanation of variables. T is time (1969.1 = 1), and
TSQ is time squared.
:j: t-statistics in parentheses.
161 Values are calculated at the mean discouragement rate
of each cohort. For instance, for female teenagers,
(.080/.64) x 100 = 12.5 percent. Values are derived
from coefficients of the unemployment rates and the
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discouraged workers would greatly diminish
under conditions of nationwide full employ-
ment. However, our statistical tests indicate
otherwise. We reestimated equation (1) for
each age-sex group, substituting a measure of
nationwide labor-market tightness for the co-
hort's own unemployment rate. However, we
used the prime-age male (25 to 54 years) un-
employment rate for this purpose instead of
the overall unemployment rate, because the
latter's value as an indicator over the past two
decades has become marred by various de-
mographic and institutional changes in labor
markets.
We derived estimates of the number of dis-
couraged workers that could be expected un-
der full-employment conditions by assuming
full-employment values for each of the right-
hand-side variables in equation (I)-specifi-
cally, by assuming a prime-age male unem
ployment rate of 3.1 percent, a value of 73
percent (the 1979 estimate) for the relative
rate of unemployment-insurance benefits, and
no change in transitory real wages. Under full-
employment conditions, we estimate that
523,000 individuals would be discouraged for











may be reflected in the greater sensitivity of
females to changes in unemployment condi-
tions. For instance, job discrimination against
females will mean a higher average search cost
for them when overall labor market conditions
change. However, our tests cannot separate
out these elements, which are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.
The general pattern observed for the aggre-
gate male and female groups is also evident
when the groups are broken down by age (Ta-
ble 4). In particular, unemployment-insurance
benefits and the change in transitory wages are
statistically significant only among the various
female groups. For females 60 and over, trend
coefficients indicate that the percentage of dis-
couraged workers has been declining over
time, which is not true for any other age-sex
group. Our results also suggest that the
chances of discouragement decline with age,
which is contrary to the implication of our ear-
lier argument that years to retirement may set
a significant limit on the work and search ho-
rizons of individuals. This may be because
younger workers expect to work a relatively
short time in a particular job, which may limit
the amount of time the individual can profit-
ably spend on search.
The various age groups also respond differ-
ently to changes in unemployment, with young
workers generally, being less sensitive than
others to changes in unemployment rates. For
instance, a one-percentage-point change in
their own unemployment rate changes the dis-
couragement rate of females aged 25 to 59 by
24.4 percent (Table 5), compared with changes
of 12.5 percent and 13.2 percent for females
aged 16 to 19 and 20 to 24, respectively. To
summarize, younger workers generally are
more likely to become discouraged about job
prospects than their older cohorts, but younger
workers are relatively less sensitive to changes
in the availability of jobs and therefore less
likely to move out ofdiscouragement when job
opportunities improve.
Discouragement at full employment
According to a popular view, discourage-
ment depends solely, or to a great extent, on
lack of jobs available, so that the number of
17* Numbers of discouraged workers derived from Septem-
ber 1979 population estimates, with assumptions of 3.1-
percent unemployment rate (male, 25-54 years) and 73-
percent relative value of unemployment benefits (early
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Discouraged vs. other non-participants
In its study, the National Commission asked,
"Is the criterion ofavailability a useful one for
distinguishing between a ready labor-force re-
serve and other non-participants?" The al-
leged availability of discouraged workers is at
the heart of the argument that they represent
unutilized and ready resources which should
be considered as partofthe official labor force.
Yet special surveys have found that sizable
numbers of individuals who had stated that
they did not want a job (were unavailable al-
though wanting to work) were in fact in the
labor force one or two years later-sometimes
in greater numbers than those who had said
earlier that they were available for work.!
To shed some light on this question, we have
estimated the job-search model equation (1)
not only for discouraged workers for job-mar-
ket reasons but also for "other non-partici-
pants," defined as total non-participants less
workers discouraged for both personal and
Total





tember 1979 population (Table 6). Just over
half the discouraged at full employment would
be prime-age workers (40 percent female and
12 percent male). Teenages and young adults
(20 to 24) share about equally in the next larg-
est group, comprising 35 percent of total dis-
couraged, and senior workers make up the
remaining 12 percent.
It is perplexing that so many workers would
remain discouraged under conditions of na-
tionwide labor-market tightness. Over the en-
tire period 1967I-1978II, the discouragement
rate for job-market reasons has averaged .37
percentage points. At full employment, then,
the discouragement rate of .32 percent is 85
percent of its mean level, and 60 percent of
the peak discouragement rate reached during
the 1975 recession.
Search theory suggests several reasons for
this paradox. First, an individual's work hori-
zon sets a limit on the time he/she can profit-
ably look for work, as long as the cost ofsearch
is positive. Consequently, those with shorter
work and search horizons are more likely than
others to leave the labor market. Discouraged
workers, as a group, may have relatively short
work horizons. Again, we may expect discour-
agement to persist, on average, if the job mar-
ket is characterized by a dispersion of wages
paid for similar skills, and individuals search
systematicaly rather than sequentially for
work, and so choose the "best" possibilities
first. As an individual continues searching,
his/her reservation wage declines. At some
point it may pay the individual to leave the
market for a while and wait for normal turn-
over to open up higher-paying jobs, rather
than accept a relatively low-paying job. Similar
behavior appears to be optimal under condi-
tions in which the highest expected pay is as-
sociated with the minimum wage.
lO In that
case, individuals find it profitable to queue for
jobs in the covered sector rather than accept
lower wages in the noncovered sector. The
same type of behavior may be seen in the case
of discouraged workers when they state that
they plan to enter or re-enter the job market
within the coming year-which suggests a ten-
dency simply to wait for the better-paying jobs
to become available.
18job-market reasons (Table 7). These estimates
are designed to compare the responsiveness of
the labor-market participation rates of both
groups to changes in unemployment and other
labor-market indicators. Both the one-quarter
lagged and long-run responses are given for
other non-participants, because our statistical
estimates indicate that non-participants re-
spond slowly overtime to changes in economic
variables, so that their initial response is
smaller than the ultimate one. In contrast, no
lagged response can be identified in the dis-
couraged-worker group.
Our results indicate that individuals discour-
aged for job market reasons are more respon-
sive than other non-participants to changes in
labor-market conditions. For instance, an in-
crease in the availability of jobs, as measured
by a one-percentage-point decline in the
prime-age male un~mployment rate, on aver-
age, led to a 20.8-percent decline in the dis-
couragement rate but only to a O.7-percent
long-run decline in the othernon-participation
rate. The estimates generally suggest that dis-
couraged workers, as a group, show a greater
willingness and availability to seek employ-
ment than the other non-participation group.
Another distinction between the two groups
stems from their reaction to an acceleration or
deceleration in transitory real wages. An in-
crease in these wages is associated with a de-
cline in the discouragement rate, and with an
increase in non-participation. Some families
apparently regard an improvement in real
wages, and resultant rise in income, as a means
of supporting more non-market time. Subse-
quently, some family members leave the labor
force, causing an increase in the aggregate
other non-participation rate. However, the
same wage circumstances lead to a decline in
the proportion of discouraged in the popula-
tion, as these individuals, motivated by im-
proving real wages, seek employment or leave
the discouraged-worker category for other
non-participation.
Because discouraged workers represent a
relatively small percentage of the population,
they generally fail to influence cyclical move-
ments in the labor force. When the unemploy-
ment rate ofprime-age males increases by one
percentage point, the initial reaction is an al-
most equal increase in both the number of
discouraged and other non-participants, but
ultimately, the movement in the labor force is
dominated by an increase in other non-partic-
ipants rather than discouraged workers (Table
7, top line). However, unemployment benefit
payments and changes in transitory real wages
Table 7
Response of Discouraged Workers for Job Market Reasons,
and Response of Other Nonparticipants, to Various Economic Changes*
Change (Percent) Change (Numbers)
DWR* Other Nonparticipants DWR* Other Nonparticipants
First Long- First Long-
Quarter Run Quarter Run
Increase of 1 percentage point in 20.8 0.37 0.7 122.770 157.530 425.720
prime-age male unemployment rate
Increase of 1 percentage point in -0.8 -0.2 0.5 4.780 122.770 331.810
relative unemployment-insurance
benefits'
Increase of .01 percentage points in -1.35 0.08 0.21 -7.970 45.920 124.110
the change in real wages
• Changes are stated in terms of an increase in each economic variable; for a decrease. the signs are reversed. The
equations were estimated over the period 1967.1-1978.2. Percent changes are evaluated at the mean rates of .37 percent
for discouraged workers for job-market reasons, and 37.46 percent for all other non-participants. Numbers are estimated
relative to the September 1979 working-age population of 159.4 million.
:j: Discouraged workers for job-market reasons, as a percent of the civilian noninstitutional population.
19also affect participation behavior, and at times
can reverse the response to changes in unem-
ployment.
The general patterncan be discerned in both
of the business cycles that have occurred since
discouraged-worker data first became avail-
able (TableS). During the two recoverype-
riods, the decline.in .other noneparticipation
was responsible for between 80 and 94 percent
of the cyclical increase in the labor-force par-
ticipation rate-and the same was true, only
in the opposite direction, during the 1970-71
downturn. However, during the.more•recent
decline, close to 70 percent of the drop in
labor-force participation was associated with
an increase in discouragement about job-mar-
ket prospects. This reversal can be traced
largely to the fact that relative unemployment-
insurance benefits playa somewhat larger role
in the labor-market participation decisions of
other non-participants than they do for dis-
couraged workers. During the 1974-75 reces-
sion, these. benefit payments increased sub-
stantially, and tendedto keep many individuals
in the labor force who would otherwise have
left and beenincluded among other non-par-
ticipants. The Current Population Survey pur-
portedly is designed to distinguish between
those.individuals ••who want work (and. are
available.for work) and all other noncpartici-
pants. The question is whether the availability
criterion in fact captures the cyclical compo-
nentof the labor force.,.........the so-called labor-
force reserve. We found that between 80 and
95 percent of the cyclical movementin .the
labor force is generally due to individuals en-
tering and leaving the non-participation cate-
gory, and not to discouraged workers. Conse-
quently, we conclude that the availability
criterion is not sufficient to capture those
workers or groups of workers who actually
comprise the major source of the labor-force
reserve.
Table 8
Cyclical Responses of Discouraged Workers and Other Nonparticipants
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(20.0)IV. Summary and Conclusions
With the help of job-search theory, this pa-
per has analyzed the behavior ofworkers who
give job-market reasons for their discourage-
ment-a group which accounts for 70 to 80
percent of the total number of discouraged
workers. Our approach suggests that unem-
ployment-insurance benefit payments (by re-
ducing the cost of looking for work) and ex-
pected real wages will influence an individual's
labor-force participation decisions-as well as
his/her chances of finding a job. The results
may be summarized as follows.
(1) Although those discouraged for job"mar-
ket reasons appear more responsive than other
non-participants to changes in labor-market
conditions, the discouraged generally repre-
sent only a small proportion of the total cycl-
ical movement in the labor force. Conse-
quently, the availability criterion of the
Current Population Survey apparently does
not succeed in separating the labor-force re-
serve from other groups of non-participants.
(2) Under conditions of nationwide full em-
ployment, we should observe a relatively small
percentage of discouraged workers. At least
according to the popular impression, discour-
aged workers are readily available for work,
and therefore their numbers should greatly di-
minish, if not disappear, under general condi-
tions of high employment. In fact, this is the
expected behavior of a labor-force reserve.
However, we find that at full employment, the
discouragement rate for job market reasons
actually tends to remain at about 85 percent of
its average level, and at about 60 percent of
its peak (1975) rate. Our job-search approach
suggests several reasons for this highly per-
plexing result. Workers with relatively short
work horizons generally find it profitable to
limit the amount of job search, which is a
costly undertaking. If not finding work within
that relatively short time period, they may
drop out of the labor force. Many discouraged
workers thus would expect to hold jobs, once
found, for relatively short durations. Or work-
ers may search the best-paying jobs first, and
not finding employment, would choose to wait
for normal job turnover-because that is the
most profitable choice for them to make-
rather than accept lower-paying jobs.
(3) The job-search approach was not en-
tirely successful in explaining discouragement
behavior over the past decade. That approach
suggests that the individual job seeker re-
sponds to the expected market return, as es-
timated by the direct costs of search (proxied
by the unemployment rate), the reduction in
such costs (measured by unemployment-insur-
ance benefits), and the expected real wage
rate. However, we found that males, who ac-
count for one·third ofthe discouraged for job-
market reasons, were sensitive only to changes
in their unemployment rates. Females, who
account for the majority of discouraged work-
ers, in contrast were also responsive to changes
in relative unemployment-insurance benefits
and to changes in real wages that were be-
lieved to be above or below average (that is,
a transitory real wage). Search theory suggests
that it is the level of real wages (transitory or
permanent), and not the change, which is per-
tinent in job-market decisions. Ourresults sug-
gest, however, that factors other thanthe avail-
ability of jobs (the conventional determinant
of discouragement) enter into the determina-
tion of discouraged workers' labor-supply de-
cisions. Discouragement is not solely a conse-
quence of the availability of jobs, but also of
unemployment-insurance benefit payments
and expected short-run changes in real wage
payments.
Should discouraged workers be included in
the labor force and therefore in the official
measure of unemployment? Since they repre-
sent only a small percentage of the cyclical
movement in the labor force, their inclusion
will do very little towards correcting any dis-
tortions in official labor-force measures. More-
over, most of these individuals appear unres-
ponsive to changes in labor-market conditions.
Large numbers ofdiscouraged workers remain
so even during periods of tight labor markets,
21when substantial shortages of workers exist
amid building inflationary pressures. This sug-
gests that most discouraged do not fit the cri-
terion of a ready labor-force reserve-individ-
ualswilling and available for work according
to the state of the economy-and therefore




The Bureau of Labor Statistics is the basic
source for U.S. employment and unemploy-
ment data. Discouraged-worker data, for ex-
ample, are found in the BLS publication, Em-
ployment and Earnings.
VIB: Maximum weekly benefits payable un-
der the unemployment-insurance system were
deflated by the consumer price index and di-
vided by average spendable weekly earnings
of production worker with three dependents.
The maximum weekly benefits series was
taken from the Board of Governors MPS
model database, and the consumer price index
and average spendable weekly earnings series
were taken from the FRB San Francisco Da-
tabase.
V: The unemployment rate of each age-sex
category was taken from the FRB San Fran-
cisco database.
W: Employee compensation rate in nonfarm
private domestic business, deflated by the GNP
implicit deflator, less permanent real wages.
This is estimaged as follows: for permanent
wages, we assume that real wages are equal to
a percentage of labor productivity. That per-
centage is equal to labor's share in total in-
come produced (gross business domestic prod-
uct)-a share which has trended slowly over
time. The share of labor can be written as an
identity:
k = total labor income/gross business do-
mestic product, where total labor income is
equal to wages times the number of workers,
W X N, and gross business domestic product
is equal to the general price level times the
amount of real output produced, P x G. We
may rewrite the above as,
k = (W x N)/(P x G), or rearranging
(W/P) = k x (G/N),
which states that real wages are a percentage
oflabor productivity. We estimated permanent
real wages by first estimating the trend share
of labor k" then the trend rate of output per
worker (G/N)"
estimate of (W/P) = k, x (G/N),.
The wage series was taken from the MPS
model database of the Board of Governors.
Appendix 2
Job-Search Model of Labor-Force Discouragement
Following the discussion in the text, the dis-
persion of offers considered by the job
searcher is incorporated into the model by as-
suming that there is a cumulative probability
distribution, F, of wages which govern theof-
fers tendered. We assume that the distribution
of wages is invariant over time in this simplest
case (so that business-cycle effects are ig-
nored), and that wage offers are independent
random occurrences from that distribution, F.
In any given search period, the probability that
the individual will receive an offer of w or less
is F(w), and this probability, given our as-
22
sumptions, does not depend on any past offers
at the time the offer is made. We further as-
sume that the individual seeks to maximize
his/her expected net benefits, which are equal
to expected wages less expected costs of
search.
In the following the symbols are defined as
c = cost per period of search
w = random variable denoting a wage offer
F(w) = cumulative probability distribution
of w; few) is the probability density
function.
y(w) = return from a job offer, w.and the mean duration of search is 1
E(N) =T (4)
The first-order conditions for deriving the
maximum expeated gain, max E(Y), is given
by
We may rewrite (2) as
Ifa wage offer is accepted after the nthoffer,
then the return is the value of the nth offer,
wn ' less the cost of search, which we assume
is a constant each period, times the number of
job offers.
Y = wn - cN
Let w* signify a minimum acceptable wage;
the individual will accept an offer if it is equal
to or greater than w*. The individual's task is
to choose w* which maximizes his/her expected






f *f(w) dw w
h cE(n)
(5)
1 Note that H(w*) is a strictly decreasing function of w*t,
with slope equal to (1 - F(w*) = p, and with
The value w* is the wage offer which satisfies
the equality in (6), The equality (6) has a fam-
ilar economic interpretation. The cost, c, is the
marginal cost of generating another job offer,
which is equal to the expected marginal return
from searching another period, H(w*t The
critical value w* is also known as the reserva-
tion wage, or the minimum wage an individual
will accept.




w* f * few) dw w
dE(Y) d
~ - dw* (h
00
= f * wf(w)dw w
00
or, c = f * (w w
p = r * few) dw w
= 1 - F(w*),
E(Y) = E(w/w ~ w*) - cE(N) (2)
Secondly, note that the expected value of N,
E(N), is the expected period of search until a
wage offer is equal to or greater than w*. It
has a geometric distribution,
P(N=k) = p(l_p)k.1
where the parameter p is the probability of
"success",
The maximum, w*, is derived by maximizing
E(Y), with respect to w*. To derive w*, first
note that E(w/w ~ w*) is the mean conditional
wage, it is the expected wage conditioned on
that wage being equal to or greater than w*.
00 J* wf(w) dw
E(w/w ~ w*) = fooJ(w) dw = h (3)
w
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